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The Theory and Practice of Party Modernisation: The Conservative Party under David 
Cameron 2005-2015  
Dr Katharine Dommett 
DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
Modernisation is a slippery word. Whilst commonly used in political 
rhetoric it is often unclear exactly what is meant by this term, or how 
successful modernisation can be discerned. This article examines the 
theory and practice of Conservative modernisation to cast light on these 
issues. Exploring recent developments in the Conservative Party in the UK 
between 2005 and 2015 it is argued that modernisation can occur at 
different levels. Using the notion of micro, meso and macro level 
modernisation, it is argued that Conservative modernisation was pursued 
at the micro and meso level but was derailed by events that altered party 
strategy. As such this article judges that David Cameron did not 
successfully modernise his party and, utilising this case, examines the 
challenges of delivering modernising change.  
 
MODERNISATION; POLITICAL PARTY; CHANGE; CONSERVATIVE PARTY; DAVID CAMERON 
In 2005, David Cameron, the new leader of the Conservative Party, promised to promote Ǯ             ǯ
(Cameron 2005). Fated as a modernising candidate during the leadership elections Cameron 
asserted     Ǯ    ǯ, and that sweeping changes 
were needed to reconnect the party with modern conditions and attitudesǡǮ
re- ǯ (Jones, 2010, pp.292-293). The language of modernisation was 
extensively used in articulating this goal, yet whilst not novel (Finlayson 1998; 2003; Kerr et al 
2012; Smith, 1994), it was often unclear exactly what was meant by this term. This made it 
difficult to state with certainty what Conservative modernisation would look like, what kind of 
change it would entail, and how success could be determined.     ǯ
election as party leader questions around the modernisation agenda still abound, but now the 
project is widely seen to ǡǡǮǯȋ
Stagg 2013, p.5). In the words of Robin Harris, a former Director of the Conservative Research 
Department, Conservative  Ǯ  Ǥ      ǣ   ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ. Elsewhere conservative commentators Ǯ  ǯ   Ǯ          ǯ  ǯ
(Strong and Compassionate; Montgomerie, 2014). In this article the theory and practice of 
Conservative modernisation is explored, arguing that by understanding the nature of change 
proposed by Cameron it is possible to comprehend why this project ultimately failed in practice. 
In surveying the existing literature on party change and modernisation there is remarkably little 
clarity or consensus as to precisely what is meant by this term, what successful modernisation 
looks like, and how modernisation can be achieved. This is largely due to conceptual ambiguity 
as modernisation is a term used to describe many different types of change both within and 
beyond the party context. In probing the nature and success of Conservative Party 
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modernisation it is necessary to dispel this uncertainty by determining how modernisation 
differs from other forms of party change, and how successful modernisation can be judged. This 
article grapples with these questions, positing a framework for conceptualisation and study in 
this area. In so doing it is argued that modernisation can be distinguished from other forms of 
change by the link made between change and modern conditions. In this way a modernising 
party diagnoses a disjuncture between their practices and/or ideas and contemporary society, 
and uses this diagnosis to re-visit and revise their ideology, policies and/or structures. Viewed 
from this perspective party change alone is not enough, a clear link must be made between 
modern conditions and change. In applying this conception to the Conservative Party it is 
argued that Cameron did outline a modernising agenda in 2005, but that this was limited in 
scope and was implemented with a limited degree of success. Aǯmodernising 
programme it is argued that the proposed change did not entail a fundamental shift in ideology 
but focused on policies and structural issues that were Ȃ in large part Ȃ abandoned as the 
political context altered. In exploring the Conservative case this article endeavours to offer 
empirical insight  ǯ eadership, but it also considers wider theoretical questions 
about the nature of modernisation and the challenges that can afflict modernisation strategies.  
In structuring this argument the article first examines the meaning of modernisation in greater 
detail and presents the analytical framework used to study this case. Second, drawing on the 
above, the article explores the nature of change in the Conservative Party, comparing 
modernisation in theory and practice to assess the progress made. Finally, the article reflects on 
the insights to be drawn from this case, considering the nature of modernisation and the 
challenges of affecting this form of change. 
WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A PARTY TO MODERNISE? 
Modernisation is at once a highly familiar and yet ambiguous process that has come to 
characterise the dynamics of contemporary party politics over recent decades. Across the 
political spectrum parties and their leaders are seen to engage in a perpetual struggle to reflect 
modern attitudes, preferences and conditions, advancing modernisation agendas designed to 
demonstrate their vitality and appeal to modern day voters. Yet, despite the regularity with 
which the term modernisation appears in political rhetoric, it is not entirely clear what this 
word means and how successful modernisation can be achieved in practice. When, for example, 
does modernisation occur, what form of change does it entail, and what causes modernisation 
projects to go astray? These questions are often difficult to answer. 
In part this ambiguity is driven by the diversity of ways in which modernisation is defined and 
discussed. Often treated as a common sense process, many academics and commentators fail to 
define what they mean by this term, resulting in subtly different accounts that make it hard to 
assess. Authors such as Tim Bale (2011) and ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
excellent overviews of modernisation in the party context - detailing different phases of 
Conservative modernisation and characterising key modernising figures - but they often fail to 
define what is meant by this term, leading to imprecise understanding. This academic 
uncertainty is compounded by political commentary that sees modernisation as a pragmatic 
tool. Peter Oborne, for example, depicts modernisation simply as Ǯ   echniques for     ǯ ȋOborne, 2011). Modernisation is therefore attributed a 
range of often subtly different meanings. For Peter Kerr, Christopher Byrne and Emma Foster it    Ǯ ǯǡ       Ǯ    ǯ 
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political parties and the state (2012). The sheer number of references to modern life, modern 
attitudes and the modern environment, as well as the emphasis placed on change by politicians, 
supports the idea that modernisation has been sapped of any coherent meaning. And yet, in this 
article it is argued that modernisation is a distinct form of change due to its emphasis on 
modern conditions. 
In conceptualising modernisation this article draws on the work of Mike Kenny and Martin 
Smith that describes modernisation in the political realm as an  Ǯ   
world in line with changes conceived to have occurred in other domains, principally society, ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?, pp.238-9). This description is echoed elsewhere in the work of 
Alan Finlayson which describes modernisation as a reaction to  Ǯnew, changed, or changing ǯ of the modern environmentǡ Ǯ        -up with ǯ(2003, p.69). These interventions recognise that it is the process by which actors (in 
this case within parties) come to perceive their existing ideas and behaviour as out of kilter with 
modern conditions, and accordingly resolve to respond to that impetus that constitutes 
modernisation. This indicates that change is an accommodation to long-term shifts such as the 
evolution of public opinion or the global political context, but modernisation can also be 
induced by sudden crises that redefine contemporary modern conditions. What is common to 
these forms of change is the idea that existing ideas and practices require adaptation to reflect 
conditions that are likely to endure. As such change reflects an accommodation to long-term 
rather than short-term shifts.  
In the party environment this process of re-appraisal should be seen within the context of ǯǤ
are endeavouring to maximise their support, aggregating the largest number of votes to secure 
electoral office or thrust a chosen issue onto the political agenda. As such when a party commits 
to modernisation they are making a strategic calculation that (most commonly) sees a 
disjuncture between modern conditions and party practices as responsible for poor electoral Ǥ    ǯ    a disconnect between 
Labour Party policy, modern attitudes and societal and economic conditions as responsible for  ǯ inability to secure victory in 1992. Recognising modernisation to be a strategic 
accommodation to long-term changes in opinion is key as it exposes the way in which short-
term change can disrupt the perceived need for modernisation. To explain this point it is useful 
to consider an example; a socially liberal party may develop a programme of modernising 
change in line with the belief that long-term changes have made social attitudes more socially 
conservative. However, an event may lead the party to believe that their previous diagnosis was 
wrong, and that there is room for a more socially liberal message. As such the party re-
interprets the need for modernisation and abandons (or substantially revises) the previously 
articulated vision for change. This possibility means that political context is key as modernising 
change focused on long-term trends can be derailed by short-term concerns motivated by 
events. As such political stability is often vital for successful modernisation as in such conditions 
long and short-term considerations can be mediated. 
The form of modernising change can differ and it is not possible, or desirable, to identify specific 
shifts as evidence of modernisation. Rather it is useful to be aware of the different levels at 
which change can occur. The existing literature on parties and modernisation is exceedingly 
useful in this regard. Tim Bale (2008), for example, identifies five indicators of party change that 
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pinpoint shifts in personnel, policy and organisation (Table 1).1 Tim Heppell discusses the   Ǯǯ(2013, p.262) and, elsewhere, Andrew Denham and ǯ highlight three factors: emphasising organisational adjustments, policy shifts and 
leadership change (2007, p.167). Modernising change can occur at any or all of these levels, but 
the precise response will depend on ǯ
the need for change. This makes it necessary to study how political actors articulate their vision 
for modernisation as it is their diagnosis that offers the benchmarks for success.   
Table 1: ǯ 
Type of Change Indicator of Change 
Personnel        Ǯǯ 
revitalising membership 
Organizational 
rationalization and retooling 
Equipping marginal seats with the human and financial 
resources needed to win and getting a grip on party 
bureaucracy, research and media operations 
Policy selection, or at least 
emphasis 
De-emphasizing issues a party  Ǯǯ 
ranging into enemy territory 
Explicit distancing from past 
practice 
Pointing out where the party went wrong in the past and how 
it will make sure it does not make the same mistakes again 
The facing down of internal 
opposition  
Containing (and if possible being seen to quash) internal 
opposition to the above 
(Table compiled from Bale (2008, p.273)). 
Kerr et al, as seen above, argue that modernisation is often used as an empty signifier to justify 
any form of change as the term Ǯǯ
(2012, p.23), but it is argued here that different forms of modernisation can occur. In making 
this assertion this article builds on the work of Peter Dorey which argues that modernisation is 
composed of Ǯ   ǯ processes of change (2007, Ǥ ? ? ?ȌǤ  ǯ
account modernisation describes a process where Ǯning to overall ideological 
position and orientation filters down into a corresponding stance on broad areas of policy, ǯ (Ibid.) Ȃ a process depicted in Table 2 (below). 
Table 2: ǯModernisation 
Level of Change Type of Change 
Macro Change to the overall ideological position that the leader adopts and 
which provides the philosophical or normative framework of policy 
development 
Meso 
 
 
Change to general statements of principle or intent vis-a-vis key 
sectors or spheres of policy, such as crime, environment and the 
family 
Micro 
 
Change to concrete policy proposals for specific polices  
This indicates a linear process where ideological change is key, but it is possible for a party to 
simply modernise its organisational structures or its branding as long as the change pursued is 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that Bale is not explicitly discussing modernisation here, but his description of change 
can nevertheless be used to highlight levels at which a party engaged in modernisation can change.  
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motivated by modern conditions. Recognising this possibility raises questions over the depth of 
modernisation and the extent of change signalled by this term. Here ǯ classification of 
micro, meso and macro change is useful as these demarcations indicate the level at which 
change is taking place. In this manner micro change indicates the most superficial level of 
change, concerning shifts in policy, personnel or branding. Meso level change refers, as Dorey 
indicates, to statements of principle, but also to shifts in priorities, and changes in party 
structures and procedures. Finally, at the macro level changes occur to the ideology of the party, 
affecting the parǯ     and the actions taken. When politicians talk of 
modernisation they tend to give the impression that they are undertaking macro level change as 
this can have positive electoral implications, but reform can often be less extensive. This makes 
it necessary to distinguishing the level at which politicians articulate a vision of modernisation. 
Party leaders can pursue change at more than one level, but to be successful they must enact the 
precise form of change proposed, otherwise they risk an expectations gap emerging whereby 
the public judge a party to have failed to deliver the promised form of change (Dommett and 
Flinders, 2013; 2014). This not only affects perceptions of success but also has implications for 
political trust as parties that regularly shift positions are deemed less trustworthy; affecting 
their electoral appeal. 
Within this article it is also argued that the level of modernising change pursued by a party is 
significant because it signals the extent to which new id     ǯ
practices and ethos. Whilst modernisation can be successful at each and every level, a 
modernisation project is most likely to be affected in practice when it is underpinned by macro 
level, ideological change accepted by the party.2 This is because such change constitutes a 
fundamental shift in the practices of the party that is likely to endure, even as short-term 
incentives and environmental conditions change. In contrast, micro and meso level change 
focused on policy, organisational reform and re-branding are liable to being re-appraised and 
altered (or reversed) in response to short-term impetus. Hence the level at which change is 
pursued can affect the chance of modernisation being successfully enacted.  
Based on this theorisation a two stage study of party modernisation is proposed that examines 
the way in which parties modernise, and the reasons for success or failure. First, it is argued 
that analysts must remain cognisant of the idea that modernisation is not simply evident when a 
party actor uses the term; more fundamental evidence of change is required. A modernising 
party can therefore be recognised as one that identifies a modern impetus to which it is 
necessary to adapt, and that then rolls out a programme of change designed to address the 
disjuncture between the party and those conditions. These changes can occur at the micro, meso 
and/or macro level as indicated in Table 3 (below). 
Table 3: The Levels and Indicators of Modernising Change  
Level of 
Change 
Type of Change Indicator of change 
Macro Change in ideology References to new values, beliefs, ideas and 
concepts consistently depicted as underpinning the ǯ 
                                                          
2 Acceptance for ideological change can be both consensual, with party members and representatives 
supporting the case for change, or it can be secured through strong leadership that neutralises internal 
dissent.  
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Meso Change in principles, 
priorities, organisational 
procedure or party structure 
References to new policy agendas, new principles ȋǯ
perspective), and procedural reforms 
Micro Change in policy, personnel 
or branding  
References to specific new policy ideas, new 
marketing strategies, new personnel 
In determining the vision of change offered by politicians analysts can utilise a systematic study 
of political documents (as done in the analysis which follows). This involves examining political 
speeches, interviews, policy documents, and manifestos to discern: 
a) The rationale for change 
b) The significance of modern conditions to explanations of change, and  
c) The nature of change proposed  
At this latter level the indicators outlined in Table 2 can be used to discern the kind of change 
proposed, using these variables as a benchmark that can, subsequently, be used to assess the 
degree of change implemented in practice. Consistency here is key, hence for a party to be seen 
to have modernised there must be an equivalence between theory and practice, with the 
diagnosed shifts in modern conditions remaining a consistent drive for party behaviour.  
Equipped with this theorisation attention now turns to recent developments within the 
Conservative Party. The remainder of the article explores the nature of change outlined by 
Cameron in 2005, considering whether modernisation, as defined above, was in evidence, how 
this project proceeded between 2005 and 2015, and why it ultimately failed. Mapping change 
across this period it is argued that although Cameron embarked on a modernisation project this 
was not delivered in practice. This outcome is traced to the level of change pursed and the onset 
of events that destabilised the strategic calculations made within, and accepted by, the 
Conservative Party. It is argued that Conservative modernisation lacked a clear and consistent 
macro level dimension that diagnosed the need for ideological change in response to modern 
conditions.3 Instead modernising change was articulated at the micro and meso level, focused 
on policy change and new principles linked to specific policy agendas. This strategy is seen to 
have been affected by events that caused party actors to reappraise their diagnosis of the need 
for change and ultimately revise and largely abandon the modernisation agenda.  
CONSERVATIVE MODERNISATION IN THEORY 
In 2005 the Conservative Party was ripe for change. The party had suffered successive election 
defeats and was experiencing its longest period in opposition since 1832 (Snowdon, 2010, p.xi). 
Since being ousted by the Labour landslide of 1997 they had failed to make headway, with the ǯ vote share rising to just 31.7 per cent in 2001 (Green, 2010), a long way short of the 41.9 
per cent achieved by Major in 1992. Despite spending a significant amount of money in marginal 
seats, successive party leaders had not enticed greater support for the Conservatives at general 
                                                          
3 This judgement does not contradict the idea that ideological change occurred in this period (as attested 
by Richard Hayton (2012) and Tim Heppell (2013)), it simply argues that ideological shifts were not 
articulated as part of a vision for modernisation.  
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elections (Hayton, 2012). Polling conducted in 2004/2005 by Lord Ashcroft revealed that the 
party faced a fundamental image problem:  Ǯthe Conservatives were thought less likely than their opponents to care 
about ordinary people's problems, share the values of voters or deliver 
what they promised. Majorities in key marginal seats thought the party 
was out of touch, had failed to learn from its mistakes, cared more about 
the well-off than have-nots, and did not stand for opportunity for all. 
And things did not improve with time - voters had a more negative view 
of the Conservative Party at the end of the campaign than they did at the ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ?ȌǤ 
Against this background Cameron was elected as Conservative Party leader having spent just 
four years as an MP. His campaign argued Ǯ             ǯ
(Cameron, 2005). Cloaking himself in the language of ǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯǮǯ
(Evans, 2008, p.297; Kerr, Byrne and Foster, 2011Ȍǡ     ǡ  ǯǡǮǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤȌǤ  
Tǯ evidence of change (Bale, 
2008; 2009; 2011; Dorey, 2007; Evans, 2008; Gamble, 2011, p.174; Green, 2010). In the place of 
a traditional policy emphasis on issues such as Europe, taxation, immigration and welfare, 
Cameron drew attention to the environment (see Carter and Clements, this issue), the NHS, 
flexible working and international aid. He publically illustrated this shift to a more socially 
liberal outlook through actions such as pledging that a third of all ministers in his cabinet would 
be female (see Campbell and Childs, this issue), and by travelling to the arctic to demonstrate the ǯ  Ǥ In addition the party was re-branded, with a new logo designed to  Ǯǡ ǡ       ǯ ȋEvans, 2008, 
p.294). In reflecting on his actions Cameron, in conversation with Dylan Jones, described his 
modernisation project as composed of three parts:  ǮYou know, the shortage of women candidates, the underrepresentation 
of ethnic minorities, the fact that we were representing mainly rural 
seats, many in the south of England. We needed to change the 
Conservative Party, literally to be more reflective of the country we 
wanted to govern. That was one part of modernization (sic). I think 
another was thinking more deeply. For too long the party had got rather 
intellectually idle, and so if asked the question about education it was 
Bring Back Grammar Schools! If asked the question about health it was 
Bring Back Matron! If asked about policing it was Bring Back the Bobby 
on the Beat! It was all a bit formulaic, and I think we needed to think 
more deeply and more widely about problems and I hope we have done 
that. Also I think there were some consequences of the changes of the 
1980s. Britain had become a more open, more tolerant society over 
issues like race and sexuality and I think the Conservative Party needed 
to modernize (sic) to catch up there as well. And there was also a more 
literal kind of modernization (sic), with a properly run Central Office 
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and press office and better organization (sic)  ǯ ȋǡ  ? ? ? ?ǡ
p.293). 
Cameron can therefore be seen to have embraced modernisation as he tied a programme of 
change to a diagnosed shift in modern conditions. These shifts were outlined at the meso and 
micro level, evident in changes to ǯprocedures (i.e. organisational reform to make the 
party more representative of society), priorities (by promoting new social concerns), and 
policies (such as pledges to legalise gay marriage). 	 ǡ  ǯ speech to the 
Conservative Party conference in 2006 he stated:  Ǯǡ    Ǥ   erent. Safer 
streets. Schools that teach. A better quality of life. Better treatment for ǤǯǤǡ
were having a different conversation. Instead of talking about the things 
that most people care about, we talked about what we cared about most. 
While parents worried about childcare, getting the kids to school, 
balancing work and family life - we were banging on about Europe. As 
they worried about standards in thousands of secondary schools, we 
obsessed about a handful more grammar schools. As rising expectations 
demanded a better NHS for everyone, we put our faith in opt-outs for a 
few. While people wanted, more than anything, stability and low 
mortgage rates, the first thing we talked about was tax cuts. For years, 
this country wanted Ȃ desperately needed - a sensible centre-right party 
to sort things out in a sensible way. ǡ ǯ    ǯ 
(2006b).  ǯ foreword to Built to Last, a statement of the aims and values of the 
Conservative Party, similarly diagnosed how:  Ǯe live in a world that is undergoing far-reaching change. A huge shift 
is taking place in economic power to the new developing economies of 
the east, bringing with it unprecedented competition and unimagined 
opportunity. The threat of climate change is forcing the world to 
innovate and to co-operate in new ways. The global terrorist threat 
demands not just new international security effort abroad but new 
efforts to integrate at home. The endemic poverty of Africa and the      Ȁ      ǯ
problems....The old answers are not working well...I am clear about the ǯ(Conservative Party, 2006, p.2). 
These statements placed emphasis on new, modern conditions, and asserted the need for change 
in reaction to modern attitudes and events. Hence, Built to Last ǮǯǡǮǡǮǡǮ- ǡ   ǯǡ Ǯ      ǯǡ Ǯ ǯǡ Ǯǯǡ and to Ǯǡ-looking 
Partyǯ ȋConservative Party, 2006, pp.4-11). These concerns were, in many instances, not those 
traditionally associated with the Conservative Party, indicating a change in the principles, 
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priorities and policy agenda of the party. What is notable, however, is that these changes were 
not accompanied by a narrative of macro level, ideological change.  
Whilst some scholars have described a programme of ideological   ǯ
leadership towards a form of more liberal conservatism (Hayton, 2012; Heppel, 2013; McAnulla, 
2010) the ǯ modernisation strategy was not explicated in terms of a new ideology, but 
rather new policies and, in some areas, new principles. Hence, whilst Cameron asserted the need 
for the party to move onto the centre ground in his 2006 conference speech, this was articulated 
in the context of vocal support for traditional Conservative values and ideas. In Built to Last, for 
example,  Ǯ aims and values are built to last; they are as relevant now as    ǯ ȋ ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǡ Ǥ ?ȌǤ  ǯ leadership 
acceptance speech     Ǯa modern compassionate Conservatismǯ the 
Conservative Party neede Ǯ        ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ, not alter its 
ideology. Hence reform, he argued, was needed of ǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǡǮthe scandalous under representation of women in 
the Conservative paǯǡstopping Ǯǯ (Ibid.). These changes, 
whilst signalling reform, were not accompanied by the articulation of a new ideological vision 
but were instead voiced alongside the conviction that Ǯ    ǯ. In this way 
Cameron focused on creating  Ǯstrong Conservative Partyǯ    values. 
This message did not, therefore, suggest macro level ideological reform, but rather meso and 
micro level change that altered the policies, principles and organisational structures seen to be 
out of kilter with modern conditions. As such ǯ modernisation agenda appeared to 
constitute a pragmatic alteration to long-term shifts in contemporary attitudes and practices 
rather than a far reaching realignment of party aims. This is significant because change at the 
meso and micro level can be vulnerable to reform if environmental conditions change, rendering ǯ      marginalisation if events Ȃ such as those evident 
after 2007 Ȃ prompted a re-evaluation of Conservative strategy.  
CONSERVATIVE MODERNIZATION IN PRACTICE   ǯ           
2005 and 2007 as after this period the Conservative Party began to move away from many of the       ǯ ǡ   (Bale 2008, p.278; 2011, p.351; 
Garnett 2010: 114). Instead of emphasising the environment, poverty, childcare, flexible 
working, and injustice, the leadership placed emphasis upon economic concerns such as 
financial responsibility, enterprise, and deficit reduction. This alteration was stimulated, in part, 
by the rising electoral fortunes of Gordon Brown in 2007 and Ǯǯ, but in 
main by the global financial crisis of 2007-8. Whilst some shift in focus was to be expected given 
the scale of this latter event, it lead not only to declining emphasis on the modernisation agenda 
but to a renewed focus upon the importance of family, strong immigration policy (see Bale and 
Partos, this issue), state retrenchment (see Martin, this issue), Europe (see Lynch, this issue), 
bureaucracy and tax. As Steve Williams and Peter Scott have argued, in this period many aspects   Ǯ ǡ        ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ? ?). In understanding the reasons for this shift 
the nature of change is seen to be critical. Whilst macro level, ideological change aims to bring 
about fundamental change in party positions by adapting to long-term shifts in modern society, 
lower levels of change Ȃ of the kind pursued by Cameron Ȃ ǯ
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ǯf operation. Such changes are liable to being revised if events 
affect actorsǯmodernisation.  
In this context the global financial crisis that occurred in 2007-8 is seen to have had seismic 
implications for ǯodernising vision as it re-framed the context of British politics and 
altered perceptions within the Conservative Party of the viability and desirability of different 
strategies. Hence, whilst prior to 2007-8 the presumption of economic growth led to a concern 
with social welfare policies and state investment, during and after the banking crisis parties 
across the political spectrum adapted their messages to new economic conditions, leading the 
Conservative Party to the marginalise the majority of ideas associated with modernisation and 
reassert more established conservative concerns. Recognising this process of re-appraisal helps 
to explain why, when the Conservative Party entered into Coalition with the Liberal Democrats - 
a partner that was ideologically disposed to support many of the new policies outlined by 
Cameron between 2005 and 2007 Ȃ emphasis was placed not on the new modernisation agenda, 
but on deficit reduction, financial responsibility and traditional conservative issues. In the 
foreword to the coalition agreement, for example, Cameron and Nick Clegg asserted:  Ǯ           Ǣ 
centralisation and top-down control have proved a failure. We believe 
that the time has come to disperse power more widely in Britain today; 
to recognise that we will only make progress if we help people to come 
together to make life better. In short, it is our ambition to distribute 
power and opportunity to people rather than hoarding authority within 
government. That way, we can build the free, fair and responsible ǯ (HM Government, 2010, p.7). 
A traditional conservative message of decentralisation, smaller government, personal 
responsibility and a free and fair society is pre-eminent here. The extent to which traditional 
Conservative ideas came to dominate was apparent in a series of high profile policy shifts that 
saw the party not simply move away from the modernising vision, but actively pursue policies 
and principles divorced from the modern ideas previously identified. In relation to Europe, for 
example, whilst Cameron lamented in 2006 that the party was Ǯbanging on about Europeǯǡ 
2013 he proclaimed: Ǯ people say a lot of things on Europe. You'll never be able to veto 
an EU treaty. You'll never cut the Budget. And if you did these things - 
you'd have no allies in Europe. Well we've proved them wrong. I vetoed 
that treaty. I got Britain out of the EU bail-out scheme. And yes - I cut 
that budget. And in doing all this, we haven't lost respect - we've won 
allies to get powers back from Europe. That is what we will do...and at 
the end of it - yes - we will give the British people their say in a 
referendum. TǤǣǯȋ ? ? ? ?b). 
Elsewhere in regards to health, despite high profile criticism in opposition of NHS ǮȏȐ
imposed from above, endless re-organisation -      ǯ (Cameron, 2007), 
Conservative Minister Andrew Landsley initiated a top down process of NHS reorganisation 
widely criticised by health professionals. Similarly, calls to place less emphasis on immigration 
around 2005 were followed by policies that implemented a cap on the number of economic 
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migrants and a high profile publicity campaign, authorised by Home Secretary Teresa May, that 
urged    ǲ     ?. In this way     ǯ
modernisation agenda were sidelined or dismissed in their entirety, with emphasis being placed 
on principles and policies that did not align with previously diagnosed modern conditions. 
These outcomes signal a reversion at both the micro level in the policies pursued by the party, 
and at the meso level in terms of the priorities and principles articulated by Cameron, 
suggesting a strategic shift away from the long-term changes diagnosed pre-2008.  
Change was also evident in relation to organisational reform. Whilst when first elected Cameron 
had placed significant emphasis on the importance of reforming the Conservative Party to make 
it more representative of the country, in office few advances were made. Progress initially 
achieved in attaining greater diversity of MPs elected in 2010 following the introduction of the Ǯ ǯ ȋ        of women and ethnic minority 
candidates) was hindered by the Partyǯ      in government (Morris, 
2012). Cameron also failed to achieve his target of a third of all ministers to be female, with his 
reshuffle in July 2014 resulting in just five out of twenty two ministers being women (for more 
see Campbell and Childs, this issue). 
These outcomes in part reflected a re-appraisal by party elites who backtracked on previously 
articulated goals and sanctioned new policy prescriptions. For example, in relation to the ǡ  ǯ     ǯ  credentials in 
opposition, once in office these were often not demonstrated in practice. In the months after the 
election, for example Caroline Spellman, Conservative Secretary of State for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs, announced plans to sell off parts of the national forest, provoking widespread 
anger amongst environmental groups. Elsewhere, in his autumn statement in 2011 George 
Osborne asserted that despite being the chancellor to bring in the green investment bank:  Ǯcombined impact of the green policies adopted    ǡ       ǥ   
[British businesses] with endless social and environmental goals Ȃ 
however worthy in their own right Ȃ then not only will we not achieve 
those goals, but the businesses will fail, jobs will be lost, and our country ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
In other policy areas changes in ǯagenda appear to have been motivated 
by internal party dissent with backbenchers, party members and some ministers placing 
pressure on the party leadership to relinquish modernising objectives in favour of more 
traditional, conservative ideas. In relation to Europe, for example, the modernising agenda 
pursued by Cameron Ȃ that ostensibly saw less attention paid to the topic - was subject to 
extensive criticism. Dissent was exemplified in 2011 when nearly half of Cameron's 
backbenchers defied a three-ǯ of the 
EU (including two private parliamentary secretaries who respectively resigned or were sacked). 
The scale of the rebellion served as a visible challenge to the modern agenda outlined in 2006, 
and was used to call for a new policy position. Indeed, following the vote, one rebel commented Ǯ ?ȏȐǤ
If he can't, there will be another motion on Europe that will be trouble for ǯȋǡ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
This climate of internal dissent preceded a change in policy from Cameron, culminating in his 
pronouncement in January 2013 that:  
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Ǯ      Ǥ       - 
shaping it, leading the debate. Not simply hoping a difficult situation will ǯȋon, 2013a). 
These examples signal that modernisation requires commitment from the leadership and from 
within the party, but that these traits were lacking in this case. As Jane Green has illustrated,  Ǯamentary Party about the strategy the ǯ(Green, 2010, p.699)  manifest in calls from Lord Saatchi for ǮȋȌǮǯ  ǯ ȋǡ 2007, p.151). Whilst Cameron was able to secure consensus for 
change within the party between 2005 and 2007, following the financial crisis and the 
subsequent failure to secure an outright majority at the 2010 General Election, this consensus 
began to dissolve, leading the party to drop key modernising pledges. 
And yet, the Conservative Party did not abandon the entirety of its modernising vision. In 
coalition key pledges on gay marriage and international aid were enacted, even in the face of 
severe internal criticism. Understanding why certain policies remained whilst others were 
dropped is complex and there is no simple formula for explaining these outcomes. In certain          ǯ  Ǣ
demonstrating their resilience and leadership in the face of internal criticism. In other cases 
political conditions beyond the party context may make it expedient to retain certain policies or 
organisational reforms (for example international pressure from the UN for the Government to 
enact its commitment to the Millennium Development Goals could have been significant in the 
decision to enforce the pledge to spend 0.7% of the national income overseas aid by 2013).  
What is notable in considering these developments is the significance of the level of change 
pursued to the success of the modernisation project. Rather than developing a clear ideological 
vision for change and securing (or enforcing) support for these goals within the party, Cameron 
formulated an agenda that was liable to challenge and revision, especially as events altered 
perceptions of modern conditions and viable electoral strategies. For some commentators this 
behaviour reflects the idea that  Ǯ  ǡ    ion of     ǯ (Bale, 2013, p.8), suggesting that he lacked a 
personal commitment to change and instead adopted a pragmatic approach designed to 
maximise electoral appeal.  
Acknowledging this possibility it is nevertheless interesting to consider that in a period of 
political stability the Conservative Party may have remained committed to the modernising 
agenda outlined by Cameron at the outset of his leadership. Events after 2007 allowed the party 
to redefine their approach, re-emphasising traditional Conservative ideas and practices as the 
best response to the financial crisis, but this development was by no means inevitable. It is, 
however, likely to have negative long-term implications for the party Ȃ especially as the 2015 
General Election approaches. The decision to emphasise short term considerations over long 
term attitudinal changes     ǯ    an outright 
electoral victory in 2010 as its message did not change to reflect the attitudes of key 
demographic groups. As the Conservatives attempt to win a majority for the next Parliament the 
legacy of this decision is likely to be felt as      ǯ  and 
practices and the attitudes of those voters. Moreover,  ǯ    further 
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support have been damaged as voters are less likely to believe future pledges of change because ǯfailure to modernise.  
CONCLUSION 
In passing judgement on the nature of Conservative modernisation this article has argued that ǯ modernisation project was limited in scope and not executed in practice. Whilst a 
modernisation programme was outlined between 2005 and 2007 that emphasised issues such 
as flexible working, climate change and female representation, after 2007 many of these 
concerns were marginalised, replaced or dropped. This outcome stemmed in part from the kind 
of change pursued by Cameron. In seeking to modernise Cameron articulated a vision of micro 
and meso level change that adapted Conservative policies, principles and party procedures to 
reflect modern attitudes. This was not underpinned by a new ideological agenda that was 
capable of embedding change. This approach proved problematic in the light of events as both 
the financial crisis of 2007-8 and the outcome of the 2010 General Election placed new, short-
term concerns at the forefront of Conservative calculations. As such traditional Conservative 
positions re-      ǯ ǡ     
modernising policies such as gay marriage and ring fenced spending on international aid 
remaining. In this way the failure of Conservative modernisation can be understood as a 
product of both the level of change pursued and of events in the period examined.  
The conception of modernisation advanced within this article therefore helps to cast empirical 
light on events within the Conservative Party, but it also offers insights more generally on the 
nature of modernisation. Whilst modernisation is often implicitly seen to involve a process of 
ideological change this article has argued that modernisation can occur at different levels, 
resulting in different forms of change. As such a modernising party can re-brand, change its 
policies, alter its priorities, re-work its structures and adapt its ideology, with these processes 
either conducted simultaneously or in isolation. What is significant about these forms of change 
is that whilst some are cosmetic and can easily be reversed, others indicate a more fundamental 
shift that revises the vision offered by the party. In seeking to maximise political appeal parties 
are keen to give the impression of fundamental change but in practice events and internal 
dissent make such shifts difficult to secure.   
In advancing this argument the article has also revealed that modernisation is by no means 
simple to achieve. Whilst it is easy for politicians to deploy the language of modernisation and 
offer visions of change, delivering these shifts in practice requires significant skill. Not only must 
a leader develop a vision for change, they must also secure consensus for change within their 
own party, and consistently articulate and enact their prescription to achieve success. Such 
achievements would be challenging in a period of political stability, but the above analysis has 
demonstrated the additional difficulties that emerge when unforeseen events arise and redefine 
the political landscape. Negotiating the tension between long and short-term trends, and ǯǡ
and can often cause politicians to renege on modernising pledges and pursue alternative 
policies and practices. Such challenges indicate the need for politicians to exercise caution in 
deploying the language of modernisation, as whilst promises of change can deliver electoral 
benefits, the majority of modernisation projects can expect to be implemented in a turbulent 
political environment in which securing change is exceedingly difficult.  
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